Legislators, Military, Mriminal 

In the first edition of this volume, I suggested that in liberal–democratic states, it is a spiral, not a pendulum, that best describes the evolution of counter-terrorist law. Introduced in the wake of the latest attack, new measures seek to expand executive authority. Legislators tend to capitulate to the executive’s demands, often under expedited circumstances and without careful analysis of how the attack occurred. h e most onerous provisions may be subject to sunset clauses, but thereat er repeal becomes extremely dificult. To allow such measures to lapse, legislators must demonstrate that the threat no longer exists, that by repealing the provisions violence will not ensue or that some level of violence is acceptable. The first two are impossible to prove and the third politically untenable. Such provisions thus not only remain, but then become a baseline on which further authorities are built, expanding the power of the executive and restricting rights.  

22 p.; 26 cm